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“Schakale und Araber”
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For Gerhard Neumann
The article in hand is offering a new perspective on Franz Kafka’s short 
but brilliantly contrived text “Schakale und Araber” by investigating pro-
cesses of signiﬁcation and resigniﬁcation, staging and restaging as the basis 
of performative strategies to do and undo acts of hate and hate speech. With 
this new perspective, this article is turning away from dominant strings of 
interpretation concerning Kafka, and particularly “Schakale und Araber”, as 
for e.g. in the (auto-) biographical approach (with and without psychoanalyt-
ical support), the historical approach (with and without focus on biographi-
cal or regional aspects), the cultural approach (with and without emphasis 
on Jewish and Judaic elements), the comparative-cultural studies approach 
(with or without its concern for orientalist discourse) the anthropological 
approach (with or without focus on Kafka’s use of animal ﬁgures). En pas-
sant, the article in hand will shed new light on these interpretations, espe-
cially in connection with “Schakale und Araber”, and refocus their insights 
in an investigation into the performative, clarifying some of the underlying 
signiﬁcation processes of Kafka’s writings as opposed to these interpretive 
arguments. Of course, this new attempt at understanding Kafka’s texts, and 
“Schakale und Araber” in particular, is indebted to some of the most out-
standing and demanding interpretations of Kafka’s works, as those based on 
style and rhetorical analyses, abstract psychoanalytical analyses of signiﬁ-
cation processes, and deconstruction1.
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In the vein of the above predominant, yet discarded approaches, from 
the very start “Schakale und Araber” has basically been regarded as a text 
reﬂecting Kafka’s biography, his personal problems and preferences, the 
historical and cultural background of his times2. Thus interpretations con-
cerned with the (auto-) biographical have focused on Kafka’s well-known 
problematical relationship with his father and subsumed “Schakale und 
Araber” under the labeling “father-son conﬂict” and “Oedipal conﬂict” from a 
very biographical point of view. Or they have focused on Kafka’s well-known 
dietary problems presenting “Schakale und Araber” as a text concerned with 
vegetarianism, health, hygiene, and the slaughter of animals3. This has been 
linked to questions about Kafka’s relationship to and view on Judaism and 
Jewishness, overwhelmingly emphasizing Jewish traditional writings and 
rituals (e.g. animal slaughter, Messiah, dietary laws)4. As different as these 
interpretive approaches may seem, one can argue nevertheless that all of 
these attempts at interpretation are about nothing else but the identiﬁca-
tion of exterior elements within the text. In other words, they try to “demys-
tify”, to “demetaphorize” Kafka’s text in order to give a meaningful closure 
safeguarded by an unquestioned exteriority, be it biographical, historical or 
cultural, of the text itself. This way of interpretation, however, does exactly 
what Kafka feared and abhorred when asking Martin Buber at the time of 
publication not to introduce “Schakale und Araber” as a “parable” (“Gleich-
nis”)5, a literary category that is bound to trigger off attempts at demetapho-
rization, demystiﬁcation, unraveling a presupposed riddle.
Contrary to these interpretive attempts of demetaphorization based on 
a clear-cut hierarchical inside-outside textual structure, the article in hand 
is showing Kafka’s reconstructing and deconstructing of performative pro-
cesses aiming at identiﬁcation and closure, and thereby not only questioning 
the validity of such hierarchical inside-outside demarcations, but establish-
ing the necessary relocation of Kafka’s – or for that matter: any – writing as 
agency within a performative ﬁeld. Kafka’s “Schakale und Araber” offers a 
variety of hate speech acts and acts of hatred and harassment, which, care-
fully analyzed, stress the failure of any attempt at demarcation or closure. 
Hate speech, intimidation, threat, and insult are speech acts which clearly 
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show linguistic and performative workings within their strategies. Acts of 
hatred, harassment, bullying, display complex combinations of somatic, 
corporeal, and linguistic performative elements closely connected to hate 
speech. In her famous book on “excitable speech”, Judith Butler is elaborat-
ing not only a clear-sighted and convincing analysis of hate speech and hate 
acts, but also a powerful set of strategies counter-acting and resignifying 
hate speech. In order to understand Kafka’s reconstructing and deconstruct-
ing of hate speech and hate acts in “Schakale und Araber”, it is necessary 
to clarify some fundamental linguistic, philosophical, psychoanalytical and 
political concepts offered by Butler’s insightful analysis.
***
Complaints about hate speech, slander, harassment and threats have 
been on the rise in the industrial and economic superpowers with long-term 
stable democracies like the United States of America, Western Europe and 
Japan in the last twenty years. Complaints are uttered throughout all layers 
and areas of societies, they don’t even stop at the thresholds of educational 
institutions such as universities and schools6. In the U.S. public and theoret-
ical discussions basically have taken place in two distinct areas: specialists 
in law like Richard Delgado, Mari J. Matsuda, and Charles R. Lawrence III. 
have taken up the debate on racial minorities, while researchers like Catha-
rine MacKinnon and Rae Langton have concentrated their work on sexual 
expression and harassment, especially pornography. The problem discussed 
in the U.S. debates is basically due to clashes between “hate speech” and 
“free speech” guaranteed by the First Amendment of the American Consti-
tution. Heated discussions in the U.S. have even led to calls for a revision 
or change of the First Amendment7. The most basic and important political 
as well as legal task was to ﬁnd a useful and practical deﬁnition for “hate 
speech” in order to structure and clarify the discussions. At the turn of the 
millennium most attempts at deﬁning hate speech turned to J.L. Austin’s 
ground-laying work How to Do Things with Words8 which differentiates be-
tween “illocutionary” and “perlocutionary” speech acts. While the illocution-
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ary speech act is deﬁned as an act that at the moment of the utterance does 
what it says, the perlocutionary speech act is deﬁned as an act that produces 
an effect as the consequence of the utterance. This leads to a short-cut deﬁ-
nition which is situated at the core of the hate-speech debates: “The illocu-
tionary speech act is itself the deed that it effects; the perlocutionary merely 
leads to certain effects that are not the same as the speech act itself ”9. With 
this turn in the discussion about hate speech, Judith Butler had to become 
one of the decisive players in the debate, for these attempts at deﬁnition do 
not only reach far into the realm of the performative, her trade mark, the 
positions that Delgado, Matsuda and MacKinnon among others have taken 
are obviously diametrically opposed to any political and philosophical criti-
cal stance Butler is known for.
Judith Butler enters this discussion by questioning the validity and use-
fulness of the term “wound” that Richard Delgado, Mari J. Matsuda and 
their co-editors make the focus point of their argument by introducing it in 
the title of their inﬂuential book Words that Wound, combining physical and 
linguistic vocabularies as if physical and linguistic “wounds” were identi-
cal. Charles R. Lawrence III even speaks of “verbal assault” and likens the 
speech act to “receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous” and 
endowing it with the power to “produce physical symptoms that temporarily 
disable the victim”10. It seems that there is no speciﬁc language available to 
describe the negative effects of speech acts, referred to as “linguistic injury”. 
Butler mentions Elaine Scarry’s inﬂuential book The Body in Pain, which 
argues that corporeal pain is inexpressible in language, in order to shed light 
on the intricate relationship of body and language and the limits which lan-
guage encounters when confronted with the body11. The American debates 
on pornography are dominated by Catherine MacKinnon, whose arguments 
in the 1990s reﬂected the shifting in the deﬁnitions of hate speech from 
“perlocutionary”, language and gestures exciting a certain reaction in the 
audience, to “illocutionary”, identifying utterance and act. In Only Words12 
MacKinnon uses the term “performative utterance” in order to merge both 
speech and conduct. She conceives pornography not only as perlocutionary in 
that it “acts on” and thereby injures women, but also as illocutionary, argu-
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ing that through its representations pornography constitutes women as ob-
jects and inferior beings. Mari J. Matsuda goes even further by adding to the 
perlocutionary level of hate speech the illocutionary power of contributing to 
the social constitution of the addressee. In Matsuda’s argument hate speech 
does not only reﬂect a relation of social domination, it enacts this domination 
and thereby ﬁxes social structures of inequality and hierarchy. Butler is ada-
mant in her opposition to these lines of argumentation endowing hate speech 
with the power to constitute its object/addressee and strongly questions the 
efﬁcacy ascribed to hate speech in the above deﬁnitions. From her radically 
democratic position she sees the necessity to clarify what is at stake in these 
arguments concerning state intervention and censorship:
 The ﬁrmer the link is made between the speech act and conduct, how-
ever, and the more fully occluded the distinction between felicitous and 
infelicitous acts, the stronger the grounds for claiming that speech not 
only produces injury as one of its consequences, but constitutes an in-
jury in itself, thus becoming an unequivocal form of conduct. The col-
lapse of speech into conduct, and the concomitant occlusion of the gap 
between them, tends to support the case for state intervention, for if 
“speech” in any of the above cases can be fully subsumed under conduct, 
then the ﬁrst Amendment is circumvented. To insist on the gap between 
speech and conduct, however, is to lend support for the role of nonju-
ridical forms of opposition, ways of restaging and resignifying speech in 
contexts that exceed those determined by the courts13.
Instead of inducing the addressee of hate speech to turn to the law and ask 
for the abolishment of hate speech, and thereby acknowledging his or her 
own positioning as victim, Butler champions a more grass-root democratic 
opposition to hate speech: a restaging and resignifying that counteracts hate 
speech without the necessity of relying on the First Amendment and juridi-
cal censorship. Indeed, her own book Excitable Speech with its relentless 
theoretical analysis of the construction and functioning of hate speech can be 
regarded as such an act of successful nonjuridical opposition.
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Unfortunately the article in hand does not offer the necessary space to 
pay tribute to the intricacy and depth, the elaboration and playfulness of 
Judith Butler’s politico-philosophical inquiry into the meaning of language 
and speech act as a fundamental condition of humanity. Here it must sufﬁce 
to give a coarse outline of her explanations of the functions and structure of 
hate speech, connecting it to the performative (illocutionary and perlocution-
ary), interpellation, the body, agency, and her conceptualization of “excitable 
speech” in order to clarify signiﬁcation processes in Franz Kafka’s “Schakale 
und Araber”.
Butler sets out by carefully investigating the description of the hate-
speech scenario offered by Delgado, MacKinnon and others as “words that 
wound”, and replaces this description with the victim’s claim of “having been 
wounded by words”. An argumentative turn that leads to an important shift in 
point of view highlighting the basic conditions of the hate-speech scenario:
 When we claim to have been injured by language, what kind of claim 
do we make? We ascribe an agency to language, a power to injure, and 
position ourselves as the objects of its injurious trajectory. We claim that 
language acts, and acts against us, and the claim we make is a further 
instance of language, one which seeks to arrest the force of the prior in-
stance. Thus, we exercise the force of language even as we seek to coun-
ter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo.
 Could language injure us if we were not, in some sense, linguistic be-
ings, beings who require language in order to be? Is our vulnerability to 
language a consequence of our being constituted within its terms?14
Butler focuses from the start on the two sides of the conﬂict involving hate 
speech. She denounces the short-sighted biased presentation of an active 
aggressor and a passive victim. According to her, the victim’s claim to have 
been wounded, includes an afﬁrmation of his or her own status as victim and 
thereby supports the speech act of the aggressor and renders it successful. 
This is not to say that Butler rejects the idea of linguistic injury, the con-
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viction of the addressee to have been terribly wounded, quite the contrary. 
However, it is her aim to probe possible modes of opposition against hate 
speech in order to counteract the aggression in a nonjuridical arena. She is 
trying to achieve this by envisaging a scenario in which the hate speech act 
fails in order to extrapolate from there to any hate speech act in general. 
Indeed, not very different from Austin, who, too, made a long and sometimes 
comical list of failing illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts in How to 
Do Things with Words.
A rather handy and plausible example presents the special case of the 
“threat”. Here it is quite obvious that the speech act expressing the threat 
is only the beginning of something that is meant to be fulﬁlled in the future, 
a promise to hurt someone. The person who is uttering a threat is indeed 
blinded by his or her own self-conceit, because it is the structure of the threat 
to claim its illusory sway over the future. If the future turns out to be dif-
ferent from what the threat stated, the threat’s failure is all too obvious. 
Nevertheless the threat remains a powerful speech act, whether it succeeds 
or fails. The failure to deliver the threat does not call into question its status 
as speech act. What is called into question is only its efﬁcacy. In order to be 
effective the threat needs to be convincing. But that which makes it convinc-
ing is not the outcome of the single threat itself. It is that which exceeds 
the singularity of the threat, that which connects it to the past as a quota-
tion. Already Austin proposed that in order to understand the performative 
character of a speech act, one needs to locate the speech act within the “total 
speech situation”. In Butler’s argument this “total speech situation” is al-
ways already exceeding the single speech act itself. Taking the illocutionary 
speech act as a starting point, Butler explains the “ritual or ceremonial” 
dimension of such speech acts:
 Such utterances do what they say on the occasion of the saying; they are 
not only conventional, but in Austin’s words, “ritual or ceremonial”. As 
utterances, they work to the extent that they are given in the form of a 
ritual, that is, repeated in time, and, hence, maintain a sphere of opera-
tion that is not restricted to the moment of the utterance itself. The il-
Herrad HESELHAUS92
locutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, 
and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely 
a single moment. The “moment” in ritual is a condensed historicity: it 
exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future 
invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance15.
While the threat has to be linked to a past as quotation in order to be suc-
cessful, the person uttering the threat involuntarily enters into a historical 
genealogy. In the political and theoretical discussion usually the sovereignty 
of the person uttering hate speech is emphasized in order to hold that person 
responsible for his or her speech act, because the idea of hate speech as a 
“mere” quotation is then understood as a limitation on responsibility. Butler, 
on the contrary, points to the limitations of sovereignty in her argument, 
which insists on the fallibility of the speech act while at the same time call-
ing for its responsibility: “I would argue that the citationality of discourse 
can work to enhance and intensify our sense of responsibility for it. The one 
who utters hate speech is responsible for the manner in which such speech is 
repeated, for reinvigorating such speech, for reestablishing contexts of hate 
and injury16. If one carefully considers the proper functioning of utterances 
such as “slander”, “insult” or “hate speech”, the above explanation shows 
its value also for the understanding of these. Throughout the course of her 
treatise, Butler is offering various examples of injurious utterances to drive 
home her general argument.
But let us return to the above quotation: the historical framework, the 
citationality of the injurious speech act is not enough to explain the enor-
mous pain and fear with which the threatened person reacts to the threat, as 
elaborated e.g. by Lawrence in Words that Wound. How can it be that utter-
ances like threat, insult or slander lead to such fearful responses – after all, 
they are only words? Austin’s concept even of the most powerful, i.e. the il-
locutionary speech act cannot grasp such reactions. In order to explain, what 
is really happening during such speech acts, Butler introduces Althusser’s 
concept of interpellation: “If hate speech acts in an illocutionary way, injuring 
in and through the moment of speech, and constituting the subject through 
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that injury, then hate speech exercises an interpellative function”17. Both 
thinkers, the linguist Austin and the philosopher Althusser, may not seem 
compatible at ﬁrst sight, after all, Austin is not interested in the question 
whether the subject preexists the speech act, whereas Althusser makes a 
point of the idea that the subject only comes into linguistic existence through 
a certain speech act. Yet they share the concept that a speech act always ex-
ceeds the moment of its utterance and has a ritual or ceremonial dimension. 
Therefore the following famous Althusserian scene of interpellation ﬁts both 
theories:
 In the famous scene of interpellation that Althusser provides, the police-
man hails the passerby with “hey you there” and the one who recognizes 
himself and turns around (nearly everyone) to answer the call does not, 
strictly speaking, preexist the call. Althusser’s scene is, therefore, fabu-
lous, but what could it mean? The passerby turns precisely to acquire a 
certain identity, one purchased, as it were, with the price of guilt. The 
act of recognition becomes an act of constitution: the address animates 
the subject into existence18.
This concrete little scene offers all the necessary components to make up 
the scene of interpellation: To become a subject, to receive an identity means 
to be interpellated. A ﬁtting equivalent scene therefore is the naming on 
the ﬁrst birthday or name day. In order for the interpellation to function 
properly the interpellating person needs to have the necessary authority for 
the act. The act of interpellation is ritualized and can therefore be repeated 
over and over again, as in the quotation the address by a policeman in the 
street. The identity presented in the act of interpellation is only temporary, 
the subject is exposed again and again to acts of interpellation. The act of 
interpellation does not only recognize the existence of a certain person case 
by case, but presents the fundamental possibility of recognition: “Thus, to 
be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, but to 
have the very term conferred by which the recognition of existence becomes 
possible”19. This Althusserian scene of interpellation of course brings to mind 
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not only psychoanalytical concepts of identity and the Other according to 
Freud or Lacan, but also the Hegelian version of the Other and is thus deep-
ly grounded in Western thought:
 Hate speech exposes a prior vulnerability to language, one that we have 
by virtue of being interpellated kinds of beings, dependent on the ad-
dress of the Other in order to be. That one comes to “be” through a de-
pendency on the Other – an Hegelian and, indeed, Freudian postulation 
– must be recast in linguistic terms to the extent that the terms by 
which recognition is regulated, allocated, and refused are part of larger 
social rituals of interpellation. There is no way to protect against that 
primary vulnerability and susceptibility to the call of recognition that 
solicits existence, to that primary dependency on a language we never 
made in order to acquire a tentative ontological status20.
Like Freud and Lacan, Butler argues that the subject is haunted by the scars 
of that  very ﬁrst interpellation which brings it into linguistic existence and 
is responsible for the subject’s fundamental vulnerability to language. The 
person who utters hate speech misuses this linguistic function in order to do 
harm to the addressee. Because this dependency on language and exposure 
to speech acts is the fundamental mode of the existence of human beings as 
linguistically constructed subjects, Butler regards a complete abolition of 
hate speech as illusory.
 The utterances of hate speech are part of the continuous and uninter-
rupted process to which we are subjected, an on-going subjection (assu-
jetissement) that is the very operation of interpellation, that continually 
repeated action of discourse by which subjects are formed in subjuga-
tion21.
Be it the negation of hate speech, be it the afﬁrmation of recognition, the 
human being is exposed to repetitive acts of interpellation, that result in 
linguistic survival or linguistic death.
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The “threat” is a characteristic part of hate speech. In racism and fas-
cism hate speech aggressively announces the “extermination” of the address-
ee. This is why the relationship of the subject to the body is never more obvi-
ous and imminent than in hate speech. In view of the devastating experience 
of history, a mere psychological explanation of the victimized addressee’s 
dreadful fears fails to understand what is really at stake. The threat aims at 
the addressee’s very mode of existence, at his or her body. This alone explains 
the imminent fear that spreads in the addressee’s body and mind. Although 
constructed in language the linguistic subject is inseparably connected to a 
body. But not only the addressee’s body, the aggressor’s body, too, enters the 
stage of hate speech as that body which is to fulﬁll the threat. “The threat 
preﬁgures or, indeed, promises a bodily act, and yet is already a bodily act, 
thus establishing in its very gesture the contours of the act to come”22. It 
is one of the characteristics of the threat that it promises the future of the 
announced act of violence, and expresses this in language. Yet there is one 
more dimension in which the body appears on the stage of hate speech, as 
it appears in any act of speech, i.e. as the unavoidable double of the speak-
ing subject. Butler follows Shoshana Felman’s argument in Le Scandale du 
corps parlant. Departing from Nietzsche’s famous diction in Die Genealogie 
der Moral, that the human being is an animal with the right to make prom-
ises, “l’animal prometteur”, Felman sets out to analyze not only what can be 
said in speech acts, but also what happens between the speaking bodies. She 
casts doubt on the principle relationship of saying and doing, of the linguistic 
subject and its material body: “Dire un faire, serait-ce possible?23”
 Felman thus suggests that the speech act, as the act of a speaking body, 
is always to some extent unknowing about what it performs, that it al-
ways says something that it does not intend, and that it is not the em-
blem of mastery or control that it sometimes purports to be”.
While the speaking subject is uttering its sentences, its own body swerves 
away, distracts from the speech act’s intention and stages another existence. 
In more concrete words: there are manifold ways in which the body is betray-
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ing, is giving away the subject of its speech. Or, rephrased psychoanalyti-
cally with Freud: the ego is not the master in his or her own house. To give a 
more concrete, but of course slightly simpliﬁed idea of what is going on, one 
could say in the case of the threat that there are two main ways in which the 
body swerves from the speech act: either the softness of the body’s expression 
undermines the intended sincerity and brutality of the threat, or the body 
comes across much more violently and emotionally than the utterer of the 
threat intended, thereby giving away the underlying emotions and pulling 
the mask off of the aggressor’s face, revealing the full extent of his or her 
hatred. Or explained in still another way, the reality of the body thwarts 
the intended message: The sheer time that a slanderer wastes by writing 
his slanderous mails betrays all his intentions and shows the pathological 
obsessiveness of this speech act and destroys the literality of the message. 
The unconscious body marks the limitations of intentionality. “The body be-
comes a sign of unknowingness precisely because its actions are never fully 
consciously directed or volitional”24. In acts of hate speech, slander, threat 
and the like, the self-conceit of the speaker assuming a position of omnipo-
tence and mastery even of the future exposes these speech acts to imminent 
failure. In hate speech, the speaker’s misappropriation of the authority and 
function of the scene of interpellation intensiﬁes this proneness to failure. 
Using the example of the threat, Butler once again explains the deep struc-
ture of hate speech and the inherent inevitability of its failure:
 The self-conceit that empowers the threat, however, is that the speech 
act that is the threat will fully materialize that act threatened by the 
speech. Such speech is, however, vulnerable to failure, and it is that 
vulnerability that must be exploited to counter the threat. [...] Neverthe-
less, the fantasy of sovereign action that structures the threat is that a 
certain kind of saying is at once the performance of the act referred to 
in that saying; this would be an illocutionary performative, in Austin’s 
view, one that immediately does what it says. The threat may well solicit 
a response, however, that it never anticipated, losing its own sovereign 
sense of expectation in the face of a resistance it advertently helped to 
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produce. Instead of obliterating the possibility of response, paralyzing 
the addressee with fear, the threat may well be countered by a different 
kind of performative act, one that exploits the redoubled action of the 
threat (what is intentionally and non-intentionally performed in any 
speaking), to turn one part of that speaking against the other, confound-
ing the performative power of the threat25.
It is surprising, what a great risk an aggressor in a setting of hate speech (or 
for that matter: harassment) is willing to take. After all, the speech act may 
trigger off a reaction quite different from the one intended. While aiming at 
smothering the addressee, it may inadvertently force upon the other (the 
addressee) a chance for an effective or powerful response. One reason for the 
excessiveness of hate speech may well be the primary scar of interpellation, 
which the speaker fantasizes to overcome through imitation and misappro-
priation. Not only in Butler’s concept, also in Freud and Lacan, the human 
subject is exposed to a primary interpellation, which leaves a vulnerability 
to the Other that can never be overcome. Yet the utterer of hate speech fan-
tasizes about his or her own sovereignty by abusing the scene of interpella-
tion and oppressing the other. And for that very reason hate-speech relation-
ships are experienced as so injurious. They tend to trap the opponents in 
a never-ending restaging of misappropriated interpellation. To grasp this 
fundamental fallibility of the hate-speech context Judith Butler re-coined 
the term “excitable speech” taken from juridical vocabulary:
 The main concerns of Excitable Speech are both rhetorical and political. 
In the law, “excitable” utterances are those made under duress, usually 
confessions that cannot be used in court because they do not reﬂect the 
balanced mental state of the utterer. My presumption is that speech is 
always in some ways out of our control26.
In this sense “excitable speech” is at the same time the deliberate and un-
deliberate effect of the speaker, who is not the original creator of his or her 
words, but echoes a prior utterance, like a quote. As a matter of fact, he or 
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she is the effect of the primary naming or interpellation. And the incident of 
hate speech reveals the fundamental failure of any speech act, in so far as 
the linguistic subject presupposes mastery of the utterance. In order to coun-
teract hate speech, Butler focuses on the failure of the speaker to control the 
speech act and its outcome. While others maintain that any criticism of the 
sovereignty of the utterer of the speech act leads undoubtedly to the demoli-
tion of agency, Butler argues that agency becomes possible where illusory 
sovereignty wanes. “The one who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign 
subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor 
and, hence, operating within a linguistic ﬁeld of enabling constraints from 
the outset”27. Butler is aiming at a new model of responsibility, one that 
is not based on a sovereign controlling speech acts, but on an afﬁrmative 
expansion of agency, i.e. a never-ending restaging and resignifying in lan-
guage. As a successful example of such restaging and resignifying, Butler 
mentions the revaluation of the word “queer”. 
Butler then exempliﬁes the meaning of agency by using a parable Toni 
Morrison related in her award speech for the Nobel Prize in Literature 1993. 
According to the parable, children are going to an old blind woman and ask 
her to guess whether the bird they are holding in their hand is dead or alive. 
The old woman, however, believes to know the motivation behind this ques-
tion, and after a long pause she responds by way of avoiding a direct answer 
to the question: “I don’t know whether the bird you are holding is dead or 
alive, but what I do know is that it is in your hands. It is in your hands”28. 
Butler regards the act of the children as hate speech and explains:
 The children’s question is cruel not because it is certain that they have 
killed the bird, but because the use of language to force the choice from 
the blind woman is itself a seizing hold of language, one whose force is 
drawn from the conjured destruction of the bird. The hate speech that 
the children perform seeks to capture the blind woman in the moment 
of humiliation, but also to transfer the violence done to the bird to the 
woman herself, a transfer that belongs to the particular temporality of 
the threat29.
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While the children try to humiliate the old woman by abusing her blindness, 
she herself counters with raising the question of ethics and responsibility. 
Butler sees her reaction as an act of performative agency because she is 
transferring the meaning of language to the question of power. Morrison 
fashions the old woman of the parable as an experienced blind writer and 
focuses in the unfolding of the parable on the functioning and meaning of 
language in general and literary language in particular. According to Morri-
son the response of the old woman is reﬂecting her thoughts as a writer: “she 
thinks of language partly as a system, partly as a living thing over which one 
has control, but mostly as agency – an act with consequences”30. For Butler 
it is important that Morrison does not make an afﬁrmative statement about 
the quality or essence of language because such a deﬁnition would betray the 
idea of agency Morrison tries to convey. She avoids any dogmatic assertion 
because that would imply mastery or control.
Morrison’s handling of the parable supports Butler’s interpretation. In-
stead of controlling her speech and the plot of the parable, so seemingly 
well construed, Morrison allows the story to fall apart half-way through her 
discourse. Suddenly, the children are no longer motivated by hate, but by 
honest yet timid curiosity, and suddenly there is no bird in their hands and 
it has never been there. The blind woman reconsiders the situation which is 
then completely resigniﬁed. As a result there remains not one single undis-
putable interpretation for the little parable. Morrison has indeed created a 
text that re-writes itself and creates a never-ending output of possible inter-
pretations.
To transfer this to the ﬁeld of politics, means to acknowledge that the 
possibility of resignifying and restaging transcends the intention of an indi-
vidual subject. Discursive performativity “is not a discrete series of speech 
acts, but a ritual chain of resigniﬁcations whose origin and end remain un-
ﬁxed and unﬁxable”31. The possibility for political opposition and change lies 
in the misappropriation of an injurious speech act. Resigniﬁcation, Butler 
insists, is not only necessary in order to counteract, but also in order to un-
derstand what is at stake in hate speech.
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***
Processes of signiﬁcation and resigniﬁcation to be investigated in Franz 
Kafka’s “Schakale und Araber” are concerned with hate speech and acts of 
hatred which are abundant in this short but powerful story. Since “Schakale 
und Araber” is a ﬁctitious text, it will be necessary at ﬁrst to look at how hate 
speech is constructed in literature. Keeping in mind the argument that hate 
speech as well as any other performative speech act, according to Austin, 
Althusser and Butler, exceeds the frame of the individual utterance – which 
in “Schakale und Araber” can be regarded as the utterances delivered by the 
characters, i.e. the jackal, the Arab, and the narrator –  it is indispensable 
to begin with the title and the preliminary remarks, since they construct the 
setting of the hate-speech scenario. Already the title opens up the dimen-
sion of citationality, in so far as it offers two semantically complex nouns 
with well-established discursive categorical functions: “Arab” being a word 
in literature that immediately invokes orientalism and all its discriminatory 
prejudice, while “jackal”, widely used as an insulting pejorative expression, 
supports this semantic level of discrimination. Therefore the combination 
of both words in the title already slightly suggests the uneasy scenario that 
is indeed unfolded in the course of the story, even hinting at discriminatory 
language.
Furthermore, Kafka’s story in fact begins with a typical orientalist cli-
ché: a group of travelers is camping in an oasis, the tall white ﬁgure of an 
Arab, who had looked after their camels, is passing by. The narrator is linger-
ing between sleep and sleeplessness, ﬁdgeting in the grass. Kafka describes 
the scene in telegram style, short sentences without any conjunctions. In the 
autograph32, the sentences are even separated by semicolon. The scene is so 
much an orientalist cliché that there seems to be no need for extra elabora-
tions. It is exactly the kind of scene one can ﬁnd in famous romanticist pic-
tures and books and in the works of their end-19th century epigones. Indeed, 
what more is needed than words like “oasis”, “camel”, “Arab” to create this 
kind of scene in any reader’s mind.
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What adds to the efﬁcacy with which the orientalist imagery appears 
before the reader’s inner eye, is the enormous inﬂuence of adult adventure 
books published in Kafka’s times by such popular authors as Friedrich Ger-
stäcker and Karl May. Especially Karl May33 claimed to have really experi-
enced all the adventurous travels he described in his books set in the North 
American plains and savannas or the North African deserts and wadis, and 
tried to support this with the use of the ﬁrst-person narrative. Kafka, too, 
in this short “orientalist” story resorts to the ﬁrst-person narrator and the 
past tense, otherwise rarely found in his works34. While Gerstäcker and 
May, however, write superﬁcially “realistic” literature, Kafka, after just a 
few lines, surprises his reader with a talking jackal, jumping out of a fantasy 
story. Indeed Kafka plays with different genres in “Schakale und Araber”, 
mixing them to an extent that they create a comical effect here and there 
in the course of the story. While the Arab guide of the group “crept upwind” 
in order to eavesdrop on the conversation between the jackal and the narra-
tor like an American Indian35 borrowed from the aforementioned adventure 
books, the jackals themselves are given features and gestures typical of an-
thropomorphous picture-book dogs:
 Und alle Schakale ringsum, zu denen inzwischen noch viel von fern-
her gekommen waren, senkten die Köpfe zwischen die Vorderbeine und 
putzten sie mit den Pfoten, es war als wollten sie einen Widerwillen 
verbergen, der so schrecklich war, daß ich am liebsten mit einem hohen 
Sprung aus ihrem Kreis entﬂohen wäre36.
When speaking up for the second time, the eldest of the jackals is al-
ready slandering the Arabs. While praising the intelligence of the north-
erner (the narrator), he does not only criticize the Arabs for killing animals 
and despising carrion, but insults and slanders them in front of the foreigner 
with arrogant and despising language. The two terms Kafka is using, “kal-
ter Hochmut” („cold arrogance“) and “kein Funken Verstand” („no spark of 
intelligence“), are not only well-known collocations, but also typical of ste-
reotype slanderous language in German, and therefore make some kind of a 
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 “Wir wissen”, begann der Älteste, “daß Du von Norden kommst, darauf 
eben baut sich unsere Hoffnung. Dort ist der Verstand, der hier unter 
den Arabern nicht zu ﬁnden ist. Aus diesem kalten Hochmut, weißt Du, 
ist kein Funken Verstand zu schlagen. Sie töten Tiere um sie zu fressen 
und Aas mißachten sie“37.
The narrator understands the slanderous dimension of these words imme-
diately and cautions the jackals by explicitly referring to the nearness of 
some Arabs who may overhear the conversation. In the story this sentence 
of course also serves to increase suspense, as did, by the way, the earlier de-
scription of the jackals, comparing their movements to the reaction of a body 
under a whip and the later caution of the narrator warning that the Arabs 
might just shoot down all the jackals38. Again this image, though brought up 
by the narrator, calls to mind acts of hatred and brute violence. However, the 
eldest of the jackals continues with yet another piece of slander: “Ist es nicht 
Unglück genug, daß wir unter solches Volk verstoßen sind”39. The German 
term “solches Volk” is pejorative and usually used when referring to Roma 
– again fulﬁlling the citational function necessary for effective hate speech. 
The eldest of the jackals then turns to the topic of cleanliness (in the Ger-
man original expressed by the word “Reinheit” which is also used in religious 
contexts): “Wir werden sie doch nicht töten. Soviel Wasser hätte der Nil nicht 
um uns reinzuwaschen. Wir laufen doch schon vor dem bloßen Anblick ihres 
lebenden Leibes weg, in reinere Luft, in die Wüste, die deshalb unsere Hei-
mat ist“40. The imagery of this sentence is not only pejorative, but downright 
racist, discriminating between “the clean us” and “the unclean them”. This 
culminates in a lengthy veritable hate speech full of slander and disdain:
 Frieden müssen wir haben von den Arabern, atembare Luft, gereinigt 
von ihnen den Ausblick rund am Horizont, kein Klagegeschrei eines 
Hammels, den der Araber absticht, ruhig soll alles Getier krepieren, un-
gestört soll es von uns leergetrunken und bis auf die Knochen gereinigt 
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werden. Reinheit, nichts als Reinheit wollen wir [...] wie erträgst nur 
Du es in dieser Welt, Du edles Herz und süßes Eingeweide. Schmutz ist 
ihr Weiß, Schmutz ist ihr Schwarz, ein Grauen ist ihr Bart, speien muß 
man beim Anblick ihrer Augenwinkel und heben sie den Arm, tut sich in 
der Achselhöhle die Hölle auf. Darum o Herr, darum o teuerer Herr, mit 
Hilfe Deiner alles vermögenden Hände, mit Hilfe Deiner alles vermö-
genden Hände schneide ihnen mit dieser Schere die Hälse durch“41.
Kafka’s choice of words here is ever so careful and serving his purpose: “Frie-
den müssen wir haben von den Arabern” is a far more euphemistic expres-
sion for violent oppression or extermination than the choice given in the 
English translation (“We want to be troubled no more by Arabs”42). The sin-
gular with the deﬁnite article referring to the Arabs (“der Araber”) is used in 
German in times of war or opposition and therefore openly hostile and rac-
ist. “Getier”, like “Reinheit”, is a reference to religion, while the exaggerated 
ﬂattering of the narrator parodies the courting for favor. Beginning with 
rhetorical parallelisms in the abstract description of the colors, the speech 
moves then on to more urging and pressing repetitions of words and com-
plete phrases, until ﬁnally reaching the rhetorical climax: “slit their throats 
through with these scissors”43. Rhetoric is here used for its original purpose: 
the persuasion of an undecided bystander. The elaborate construction of the 
speech the eldest jackal is giving here turns our attention back to the begin-
ning of the text, and makes apparent how brilliantly Kafka has contrived the 
whole story: In order to achieve the greatest hate-speech effect in so short 
a story, Kafka starts practically from zero, i.e. the seemingly objective style 
of the telegram, only to quickly and relentlessly change his style into the 
talkative and ﬂowery prolixity so easily attributed to orientalism together 
with the negative human characteristics of stubbornness and vengeance as 
displayed by the jackals’ eldest. This paper, however, does not want to argue 
the case of orientalism, it just wants to show how Kafka is using prejudiced 
and racist material from orientalism in order to create a discursive frame 
that advances smoothly the characters’ hate-speech utterances. In any case 
we cannot forget that the originator of such hate-speech language is not an 
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oriental, but a talking jackal.
Compared with this jackal, the Arab seems at ﬁrst sight much more 
composed and cold-blooded. His words when referring to the jackals are ar-
rogant and superior: “Eine unsinnige Hoffnung haben diese Tiere, Narren, 
wahre Narren sind sie. Wir lieben sie deshalb, es sind unsere Hunde”44. The 
jackals’ complaints about the behavior of the Arabs he swiftly pushes aside, 
even making fun of them in the parodistic repetition of their hurt and hostile 
feelings: “Wunderbare Tiere, nicht wahr? Und wie sie uns hassen!”45. Yet, 
more than slander, the Arab is using harassment to ﬁght the jackals. The 
absolute climax of this short story is not the eloquent hate speech of the el-
dest jackal, but rather the blood-draining violent scene in which the jackals 
tear the carcass of the camel to pieces under the slashing whip of the Arab 
guide:
 Vier Träger kamen und warfen den schweren Kadaver vor uns hin. 
Kaum lag er da, erhoben die Schakale ihre Stimmen. Wie von Stricken 
unwiderstehlich jeder einzelne gezogen, kamen sie stockend, mit dem 
Leib den Boden streifend heran. Sie hatten die Araber vergessen, den 
Haß vergessen, die alles auslöschende Gegenwart des stark ausdun-
stenden Leichnams bezauberte sie. Schon hieng einer am Hals und fand 
mit dem ersten Biß die Schlagader. Wie eine kleine rasende Pumpe, die 
ebenso unbedingt wie aussichtslos einen übermächigen Brand löschen 
will, zerrte und zuckte jede Muskel seines Körpers an ihrem Platz. Und 
schon lagen in gleicher Arbeit alle auf dem Leichnam hoch zu Berg.
 Da strich der Führer kräftig mit der scharfen Peitsche kreuz und quer 
über sie. Sie hoben die Köpfe, halb in Rausch und Ohnmacht, sahen die 
Araber vor sich stehn, bekamen jetzt die Peitsche mit den Schnauzen zu 
fühlen, zogen sich im Sprung zurück und liefen eine Strecke rückwärts. 
Aber das Blut des Kameels lag schon in Lachen da, rauchte empor, der 
Körper war an mehreren Stellen weit aufgerissen. Sie konnten nicht 
widerstehn, wieder waren sie da“46.
The Arab’s wielding of the whip is not only an outrageous act of violence 
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aiming at the jackals’ bodies, it is also a heinous act of psychological terror, 
subduing the jackals with a brutally contrived double bind, leaving them 
no choice but to lose. For if the jackals want to eat, they will have to endure 
the whiplashes, yet if they want to avoid the whip, they will suffer from 
their hunger and their desire. Indeed, the jackals’ bodies in this scene show 
clearly what is at stake in the violent conﬂict of these two parties, and fur-
thermore in any hate-speech relationship. At the end of the story the reader 
may very well, like the narrator from the north, be shocked to see in how vi-
cious a circle the jackals and Arabs have entered, how their antagonism will 
continue eternally lest it shall draw “blood”47. This camel scene has all the 
elements of a repetitive rite, and with the growing brutality and hostility in 
this story, one is well reminded of the endings of the most terrible cases of 
hate speech and hate acts in the reality of human history.
According to Judith Butler and Shoshana Felman the speaking subject 
of the speech act is betrayed by his or her own body, swerving away and 
undermining the subject’s intentions. When it comes to hate speech, this is 
even more the case, since the attempt of the speaking subject to imitate the 
fundamental scene of interpellation, misappropriating the authority to in-
terpellate, and thereby clearly exceeding its own limited function, increases 
the proneness to failure, reﬂected also in the betrayal of a body thwarting 
its subject’s intentions. “Schakale und Araber” is not only a story about hate, 
hate speech and hate acts, but also about the body and its stakes.
The perfect example for Butler’s and Felman’s argument is the lengthy 
hate speech of the jackals’ eldest. He is in fact trying to use his body in order 
to persuade the narrator, when he takes recourse to the “natural plaintive-
ness of his voice”, yet the narrator is not really molliﬁed. Even here the jack-
al’s attempt to exploit his body’s powers fails. At the beginning of his argu-
ment, however, the jackals’ bodies are already belying his words. While he is 
trying to convince the narrator of the righteousness of their strife for “clean-
liness”, “a rank smell which at times I [the narrator] had to set my teeth to 
endure streamed from their open jaws”48, counteracting the intention of the 
jackal’s speech. Furthermore, Kafka introduces a meaningful metaphor for 
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the complex relationship of the somatic body and the linguistic subject: “das 
Gebiß”, rendered as “teeth” in the English translation. The German word 
“Gebiß”, however, does not only show a parallel construction to “Gehör” and 
“Gesicht”, hearing and seeing senses of the body, and thereby underscoring 
the argument of the jackal, it is also fashioned from the underlying verb 
“beißen” (“to bite”), rendering the most corporeal function of this body part, 
as well as its sarcastic metaphorical cultural-linguistic usage (as in “biting 
ridicule”). “Wir sind arme Tiere, wir haben nur das Gebiß; für alles was wir 
tun wollen, das Gute und das Schlechte, bleibt uns einzig das Gebiß”49. Such 
sentences reveal the functioning of Kafka’s talking animal ﬁgures, which 
shed from their oblique positions new light onto the fundamental conditions 
of the human being as a linguistic subject in a material body50; – in this case 
the likeliness of “biting” and “talking”, which may be more universal than 
the hate-speech framework of this story suggests. Moreover, throughout the 
text, Kafka makes use of imageries and sayings connected to “Gebiß” offered 
by the German language. The most appropriate of these in this story certain-
ly is “Verbissenheit”51 (“doggedness”), a perfect metaphor for the relentless 
and helpless way in which the subject of hate speech sinks his or her teeth 
into the other’s body. A metaphor that is as much reclaiming the argument 
of the interrelatedness of linguistic and bodily harm: “words that wound”, as 
it is underscoring the somatic level in hate speech.
While the jackals’ side offers these overt and comprehensible examples 
of the treacherous relationship of body and subject, the representation of this 
relationship as far as the Arab is concerned is more latent and covert. In the 
last scene of the story, when the Arab guide is feeding and at the same time 
for no obvious reason at all hitting the jackals, he displays a seemingly un-
questionable and unlimited power over the animals. It is not only the power 
to hurt, it is even more so the power to feed. After all, the jackals, who, at 
least in Kafka’s story, are unable to kill prey by themselves, are completely 
dependent on another being to “commit the crime” and to supply them with 
food. According to the representation of the jackals, the Arabs kill animals in 
order to eat. However, in this scene, the Arab guide makes a point of explain-
ing that the dead camel was not killed but died of natural causes, expressed 
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by the German word “verendet”. Since the caravan at this moment is about 
to move on, it is curious that the Arab does not simply leave the dead camel 
behind, but takes great pains to present it to the jackals. He obviously wants 
to display his power and superiority. But by doing so, his whipping becomes 
so violent, the whole scene becomes so ghastly and primordial, that the nar-
rator watching the scene seems horriﬁed and interferes with a mild gesture. 
In spite of the will to display his unlimited power and superiority, the Arab 
loses control of this scene, and almost loses the consent of the northerner. 
Here, too, it is the body which goes berserk and strays and stages a very dif-
ferent scene from what the Arab most likely had planned.
There is one other scene, in which the Arab’s body is betraying his words. 
Although he pretends to be superior and unconcerned about the jackals’ com-
plaining and scheming, even making fun of them in front of the northerner, 
he again takes great pains to even eavesdrop on their discussion with the 
foreigner. If he is as careless about this as he pretends, why does he bother 
and take so much time and circumspection to creep “upwind” and eavesdrop 
on their conversation like an American Indian creeping up on an enemy? To 
ask, what he wanted to overhear, makes this scene even more grotesque. For 
he himself declares that what he heard is not only well-known to him, but to 
everybody else, and moreover it was exactly what he expected:
 [D]as ist doch allbekannt, solange es Araber gibt, wandert diese Schere 
durch die Wüste und wird mit uns wandern, bis ans Ende der Tage. Je-
dem Europäer wird sie angeboten zu dem großen Werk, jeder Europäer 
ist gerade derjenige welcher ihnen berufen scheint52. 
Indeed, he himself is uttering these words, “that pair of scissors goes wan-
dering through the desert and will wander with us to the end of our days”, 
as if invoking his fate, his latent fears, or the despicable link that will fasten 
him forever to these “vile beasts”. Although pretending to be superior and 
sovereign, he is indeed haunted by that little pair of scissors. He tries to 
shake it off with a laugh, but that does not come out so well either. This rusty 
little pair of scissors – Kafka surely enjoyed the irony of this image to the 
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fullest – it is of course the symbol of his Oedipal castration complex. But it 
is not only his. The jackals share that problem. It is to them, that the pair of 
scissors belongs53. But their Oedipus complex is so apparent that it hardly 
needs mentioning54. Chopping off the Arab’s head is of course a metaphor 
for the Oedipus complex in which the son fantasizes to kill his father in 
order to avoid parental castration or subjugation. The Arab with his seem-
ingly unlimited, archaic power (feeding and punishing) is of course a perfect 
symbol for the father’s position in patriarchy: Le nom/non du père. Even the 
narrator seems somewhat fascinated by his seemingly unlimited strength 
and primordial authority. The case of the Arab’s Oedipus complex, however, 
is more complicated. While he plays the role of the father ﬁgure in the jack-
als’ Oedipus complex, he is not really their father. He is only assuming the 
position of authority through hate speech and hate acts, i.e. his arrogant 
slander and his brutal harassment. In fact he is only misappropriating the 
authority characteristic of the scene of interpellation: Not only does he call 
the jackals his dogs, assuming a mastery that does not belong to him, he 
is also trying to dominate and subdue them with carrot and stick, literally 
with meat and whip. His case therefore is only a variation of the prototypical 
Freudian Oedipus complex displayed by the jackals. By harassing the other, 
he is assuming a position that does not belong to him, misappropriating the 
authority of interpellation and fantasizing about a power (the power of nam-
ing and thereby deciding another being’s destiny) that he simply does not 
have. Looking at this relationship of Arabs and jackals, it becomes apparent 
that it is not only the Oedipus complex which links their fate, but also the 
Hegelian dialectic relationship of master and slave; the Arab is not at all as 
independent and sovereign as he would like to make believe.
There is one rather conspicuous aspect in which Franz Kafka’s story 
varies from Judith Butler’s enactment of the hate-speech scenario, and this 
concerns the number of players. While Butler describes it as a bilateral an-
tagonistic clash between the person who utters hate speech and the person 
who is forced to hear it, Kafka introduces a third party, the narrator from 
the north. Both antagonistic parties, the jackals and the Arabs, try to win 
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this third person over onto their side. The jackal does not only slander the 
Arabs viciously in front of the northerner, he even tries to talk him into 
killing them for their sake. His attempt at persuasion is accompanied by a 
strong seductive gesture: The jackal approaches him as if he were the long 
awaited savior of their lot, offering him the highest act of interpellation: that 
of a God-sent Messiah. Yet the northerner declines the offer. To become the 
Messiah of a pack of jackals and slit throats with a rusty pair of scissors is, 
after all, not exactly tempting.
Compared to this, the Arab’s attempts are much more subtle. He se-
duces the foreigner with the suggestion that they are similar and equal in 
kind, human beings as opposed to the animals. In his last speech he uses 
the “we” in a way that also allows to include the northerner: “ ‘Du hast Recht 
Herr’, sagte er, ‘wir lassen sie bei ihrem Beruf ’ ”55. And in the following sen-
tence he underscores once more the difference that separates in his opinion 
the jackals from the two human beings: “Gesehn hast Du sie. Wunderbare 
Tiere, nicht wahr?”56 even treating the jackals like freaks on a fair or a circus 
display. This, however, is not the only time that the Arab is referring to a 
spectacle in connection with the jackals. After rushing out of the hiding place 
he used in order to eavesdrop on the conversation between the jackals and 
the northerner about the scissors, the Arab uses the word (“Schauspiel”) ex-
plicitly to criticize the show the jackals are putting on to entice the foreigner: 
“So hast Du Herr auch dieses Schauspiel gesehn und gehört”57. But the jack-
als are not the only ones who are putting on a show. The Arab does it, too, 
to show off his superiority. What else is the scene with the dead camel, but 
a spectacle put on to impress – who? Its function is certainly to teach once 
more the jackals a lesson of who is the master in this relationship. But is it 
not also a show put on to impress the foreigner? After all, the Arab is much 
more deeply entangled in this conﬂict than he tries to make believe. There is 
always the possibility, no matter how remote, that the constant nagging and 
scheming of the jackals may turn out successful.
The narrator, a foreigner from the north, is approached by both par-
ties to side with them, but he keeps to himself. Twice he tries to calm them 
down with a mild gesture. But once he, too, becomes so emotionally involved 
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that he not only stirs up more hostile feelings in the jackal, but he himself 
loses control over his body: “ ‘O’, sagte ich wilder als ich wollte, ‘sie werden 
sich wehren, sie werden mit ihren Flinten Euch rudelweise niederschießen’ ”58. 
Unwillingly, he has become the third party, desired by both sides in this 
competition. And it seems impossible for him to keep out of their conﬂict, at 
least for as long as he is in contact with the warring parties, since neither 
of them is willing to stop his wooing for his support and recognition. Like in 
the Oedipal triangle, where the antagonistic parties of father and son are 
competing for the mother’s love, the two antagonistic parties of the hate-
speech scenario are wooing for the third person’s consent and recognition of 
their claims. The actors in hate speech, like in hate acts, need an applauding 
audience not only to live out their hatred to the full. We should not forget 
that both parties have a very weak position, the attacked because he or she 
feels victimized and the aggressor because he or she knows in the innermost 
heart, that he or she does not really own the position he or she is pretend-
ing to have. After all, the misappropriated authority of interpellation is only 
fake and so is the sovereignty that the aggressor assumes. The success of 
his or her hate speech (slander, harassment) is as much dependent on the 
afﬁrmation of the person victimized, as on the credulity of the lookers-on. 
This is Judith Butler’s argument: once the aggressor has done the fatal step 
to start a hate-speech relationship, he or she has unwillingly put his or her 
own position and reputation at risk.
In Kafka’s story the failure is complete: The northerner – the Arab once 
refers to him as European – does not live up to the naïve expectations of the 
jackal. He is certainly not a Messiah, he is not even able to solve the conﬂict. 
Neither does Kafka present him as someone who has a superior position to 
the hostile parties or even sees through their calamities. His suggestion that 
this is a “very old quarrel”, “in the blood”, that may not end unless blood 
is ﬂowing59, is not in the least compatible with any modern ethical stance. 
Most likely he will simply return home, leaving the two parties alone with 
their problems. The jackals and the Arabs, too, have failed in their respec-
tive endeavor to gain advantage over the adversary through the foreigner. 
In the end it looks as if the conﬂict between the jackals and the Arabs will 
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continue forever and change to the worse. At the end of the story, it is neither 
the northerner/European nor the narrator who has the last word, but the 
harassing Arab. Ironically he is the one to ﬁnd the appropriate label not only 
for this story, but for every hate-speech relationship. How pessimistic this 
ending is, shows the ﬁnal word in the German original with which Kafka has 
chosen to end this story: “hassen”.
“Schakale und Araber” is indeed a very pessimistic story – as far as the 
plot and the conﬂict triangle of the characters are concerned. In this respect 
Kafka has aptly shown the complete failure of any hate-speech scenario. But 
there is also the aspect of reader response. After all, Kafka has taken great 
pains not only to describe, but also to discuss the problem of hate speech and 
harassment in this story. The last cynical words of the harassing Arab are 
bypassing the narrator and turned directly also to the reader, who is, so to 
speak, looking over the narrator’s shoulder. With this gesture, Kafka pulls 
the reader right into the text, confronting him directly with the outcome of 
the story and forcing him to take a position, unless he wants to imitate the 
failure of the narrator and dodge the responsibility, walking away from the 
story.
It is not the intention of this article to read “Schakale und Araber” as 
the literary construction of hate speech. The text can only be understood as 
a resignifying process answering to preexisting hate-speech scenarios. Kafka 
has taken great pains to construe a text and a conﬂict that allows no single 
consistent explanation. The attempt to criticize it as orientalism, for showing 
a despicable image of Arabs, is bound to fail not only because the text uses 
any elements of orientalism to expose the European narrator and with him 
Western colonialism, for example through the naïve Messianic belief in sal-
vation by the European expressed by the jackals, but criticized by the Arab 
who sees through Western pretenses, but also through the simple existence 
of a talking jackal, which safes this story from being taken as realistic, and 
stresses the process of its construction and its ﬁctitiousness. The attempt to 
regard it as a valid description of the plight of the Jews in European history 
is also bound to fail, since the jackals are too negative an image for European 
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Jewry. Even the more speciﬁc argument by Sander L. Gilman cannot stand 
up to closer scrutiny. He is identifying the jackals with the Jews only as far 
as the heated criticism of Jewish ritual slaughter starting in the middle of 
the 19th century is concerned60. In Kafka’s story, however, surprisingly the 
argument against the brutality of Jewish ritual slaughter is expressed by 
the jackals themselves denouncing the slaughter by the Arabs.
Even the Oedipus complex, though strongly evoked by the story, cannot 
be considered as an explanatory model for the reasons and motivations or 
even the underlying structure of hate speech. The article in hand sets great 
store by the symbol Kafka has put at the center of the Oedipal conﬂict: the 
rusty little pair of scissors, which is simply too ironical not to topple any at-
tempt at serious psychoanalytical interpretation. To allow a psychoanalytical 
master discourse to give meaning to hate speech means to halt the process of 
resigniﬁcation and to assume a position of naming that ﬁxes the theoretical 
perspective and allows no further restaging. Kafka is not using the Oedipus 
complex to explain his story, but to (re)stage it. In this sense “Schakale und 
Araber” can only be understood as a parody of the Oedipus complex.
Regarding “Schakale und Araber” as a continually resignifying and re-
staging text, the many paradoxes, the countless inexplicable digressions and 
discriptions, the juxtapositions of various genres, and the many comical ef-
fects, all, suddenly, fall into place. With this kind of écriture Kafka is able to 
achieve three effects: First, on the level of satire, he is debasing and deriding 
the aggressors of hate speech and hate acts, slander and harassment. He 
is not criticizing the aggressors, he is simply making fun of them and their 
self-inﬂicted tragic-comical predicament. Second, by avoiding any ﬁxation 
of meaning, he is not falling into the trap of interpellation, name-calling, or 
false sovereignty. Quite the contrary, his circumspect writing exposes such 
acts of ﬁxation – the trade mark of his texts. It is for good reasons that 
Kafka’s story does not side with any of the quarrelling parties; neither the 
jackals nor the Arabs, not even the narrator is beyond doubt. And third, 
in “Schakale und Araber” Kafka is resignifying and restaging hate speech 
and hate acts, and thereby not only turning the screw of interpretation and 
power, shedding an analytical light on the processes of doing and undoing 
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the performative, but also enabling agency as discursive performativity by 
opening up a ritual chain of resigniﬁcations whose origin and end remain 
unﬁxed and unﬁxable.
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